[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":190},["ShallowReactive",2],{"project-14166467":3},{"id":4,"name":5,"line":5,"line_source":6,"title":7,"url":8,"domain":9,"maker":10,"posted_at":11,"year":12,"points":13,"comments":14,"rank_in_year":15,"shown_in_year":16,"top":17,"tier":18,"category":19,"subcategory":20,"format":21,"keywords":22,"reception":28,"sentiment":29,"stance_mix":30,"scored_comments":33,"aspects":34,"strip":38,"post_text":40,"what":41,"said":61,"maker_in_thread":116,"shape":118,"grid":123,"attempts":152,"same_week":153,"maker_shows":140,"maker_hidden":182,"reader_version":183,"card":184},"14166467","Recursive DNS Server Fingerprint","title","Show HN: Recursive DNS Server Fingerprint","https:\u002F\u002Frecdnsfp.github.io\u002F","recdnsfp.github.io","pjf",1492788979,2017,120,13,354,2242,16,"notable","security_privacy","dns censorship measurement","web_app",[23,24,25,26,27],"dns fingerprint","dnssec","dns censorship","ripe atlas","dns hijacking","curious",0.042,{"positive":31,"neutral":32,"mixed":31,"critical":31},1,5,8,{"idea":35,"execution":37},{"positive":31,"critical":36},0,{"positive":36,"critical":31},[32,39,36,36,36,39,31,39,39,39,39,36,36],3,null,{"problem":42,"audience":40,"pricing":40,"motivation":40,"time_to_build":40,"stack":54,"openness":60,"stage":60,"team_size":60},{"value":43,"source":44,"evidence":45},"Detects DNS hijacking and filtering by recursive resolvers across countries","inferred",[46,50],{"id":47,"by":48,"text":49},"14168454","willscott","This is a very cool use of RIPE Atlas! Note that it's not going to flag many of the censorship apparatus, because they will inject replies only for queries matching their denied…",{"id":51,"by":52,"text":53},"14169059","toast0","> We used all RIPE Atlas probes (~9000 probes) to send DNS queries to 8.8.8.8. Each probe issued several queries, a single query covered one of the features described above (e.g.…",[55],{"value":56,"source":44,"evidence":57},"RIPE Atlas",[58,59],{"id":47,"by":48,"text":49},{"id":51,"by":52,"text":53},"unknown",{"praise":62,"objections":72,"requests":87,"questions":92,"alternatives":100},[63],{"value":64,"source":65,"evidence":66},"Interesting, useful research using RIPE Atlas","commenter",[67,71],{"id":68,"by":69,"text":70},"14167005","gtirloni","It's nice to see a country as large as Brazil having 24% of its domains with DNSSEC records (973k out of 3.9m domains). I expected it to be close to zero. This is very…",{"id":47,"by":48,"text":49},[73,83],{"value":74,"source":65,"evidence":75},"Sample sizes differ greatly between countries, so percentages are unreliable",[76,80],{"id":77,"by":78,"text":79},"14166739","JoshTriplett","Seems odd that their tests have a drastically different number of probes from different source countries. total_probes ought to be exactly the same from every source, for a more…",{"id":81,"by":52,"text":82},"14167205","It sounds like they used all the probes available. Many of the countries simply have very few RIPE Atlas probes available; I don't think it's reasonable to only select 5 probes…",{"value":84,"source":65,"evidence":85},"Censorship injecting only for denied patterns means many cases go undetected",[86],{"id":47,"by":48,"text":49},[88],{"value":89,"source":65,"evidence":90},"Add DNSSEC statistics per ccTLD alongside the fingerprint report",[91],{"id":68,"by":69,"text":70},[93],{"value":94,"source":65,"evidence":95},"Did anyone release more details on the NIC.br compromise?",[96],{"id":97,"by":98,"text":99},"14180980","gcb0","Did anyone ever release any more info on this? so far, all points to the bank falling for a scam and releasing credentials to nic.br",[101,112],{"value":102,"source":65,"evidence":103},"RIPE Atlas probe network",[104,108],{"id":105,"by":106,"text":107},"14168219","forcer","If anyone is interested expanding the research in countries with low RIPE Atlas coverage, we can provide free research access to our Probe API which has over 10x more probes than…",{"id":109,"by":110,"text":111},"14167276","swinglock","If you are not represented, join us! https:\u002F\u002Fatlas.ripe.net\u002Fget-involved\u002Fbecome-a-host\u002F",{"value":113,"source":65,"evidence":114},"SpeedChecker Probe API",[115],{"id":105,"by":106,"text":107},{"comments":36,"answered":36,"key":117},[],{"commenters":119,"max_depth":120,"maker_replies":36,"first_comment_mins":121,"lifespan_hours":122},10,4,27,56,[124,126,130,133,136,137,139,142,146,147,149,150,151],[68,36,32,125,69,36],"project\u002Fpositive\u002Fidea",[127,36,39,128,129,36],"14167026","project\u002Fneutral\u002Fidea","devnull42",[131,36,36,132,98,36],"14168610","other\u002Fneutral\u002Fnone",[134,36,36,132,135,36],"14170895","dschulz",[97,36,36,132,98,36],[47,31,39,138,48,36],"project\u002Fmixed\u002Fidea",[77,140,31,141,78,36],2,"project\u002Fcritical\u002Fexecution",[143,140,39,144,145,36],"14167037","project\u002Fneutral\u002Fexecution","zimbatm",[81,140,39,144,52,36],[148,140,39,144,78,36],"14168172",[51,140,39,144,52,36],[105,140,36,132,106,36],[109,140,36,132,110,36],[],[154,159,164,169,173,178],{"id":155,"name":156,"points":157,"category":158},"14180673","Timestrap",264,"productivity",{"id":160,"name":161,"points":162,"category":163},"14202456","Commento",233,"web_saas",{"id":165,"name":166,"points":167,"category":168},"14183597","nescat.gcubed.co",196,"games",{"id":170,"name":171,"points":172,"category":158},"14204759","Kobble",179,{"id":174,"name":175,"points":176,"category":177},"14167466","WrapAPI v2",166,"dev_tools",{"id":179,"name":180,"points":181,"category":168},"14202124","BreakLock",139,false,"v2",{"id":185,"name":5,"line":5,"ai":182,"cat":19,"year":12,"points":13,"comments":14,"rec":28,"s":186,"top":17,"kw":187,"maker":10,"domain":9,"tier":18,"attempts":36,"strip":188,"url":8,"mix":189,"praise":64,"objection":74,"sub":20},14166467,0.04,[23,24,25,26,27],"5300031333300",[31,32,31,31],1794036554575]