Gmelius

Productivity

email tools

SHOW HN2018

Gmelius

Prevent email forgery in Gmail using a Blockchain-powered architecture

gmelius.com

#email forgery#email timestamping#gmail#blockchain#merkle tree

19points
14comments
#1,225of 2,155 in 2018
Top 57%of 2018 by points

How HN took it

RoastedHalf or more of the comments are critical

0 positive, 1 neutral or asking, 0 mixed, 7 critical, out of 8 comments about the project. Thread score -0.53.

Idea: 0 for, 4 againstPrivacy: 0 for, 2 againstExecution: 0 for, 1 against

The thread, comment by comment

Each row is a top-level comment and its replies, in HN's order. Select a cell to open that comment on HN.

positive neutral or mixed critical about another commenter or something else the maker

What HN said

Objections

  • Blockchain adds no real benefit over existing email signatures

    From 2 comments
    • What benefit does the anchoring give over just the signing part? Surely the signature is enough to prove that the email is from the expected sender? I feel like this is just an…
      vivan on HN
    • Yes, because the killer feature missing from SPF + DKIM + DMARC is "blockchain". <rolls eyes> Every time I see some new "<reliable tech>, now with Blockchain!" announcement, it…
      jlgaddis on HN
  • Timestamping proves existence at a time, not sending or authenticity

    From 1 comment
    • How does that prove the email was sent, though? Couldn't one timestamp the email into the blockchain, without actually sending the email to the other party? Edit: btw, I released…
      nadaviv on HN
  • Gmelius is a trusted third party, so the blockchain does not remove trust

    From 1 comment
    • Well, doesn't that mean that the security model is based on you acting as trusted third party and relying on you to only write truthful data to the blockchain? In other words,…
      nadaviv on HN
  • 512-bit RSA key is far too weak

    From 2 comments
    • Big red flag: > The hash of an email is computed using the SHA2-512 hashing algorithm and signed with our own 512-bit private RSA key. Why even bother signing it if your key is…
      crote on HN
    • "The insertion is done when we have received a response from Google servers" But GMelius is a client-side application, right? According to your whitepaper, the insertion is done…
      crote on HN

Questions

  • Why anchor each email rather than the Merkle root

    From 1 comment
    • Big red flag: > The hash of an email is computed using the SHA2-512 hashing algorithm and signed with our own 512-bit private RSA key. Why even bother signing it if your key is…
      crote on HN
  • How does it prove the email was actually sent

    From 2 comments
    • How does that prove the email was sent, though? Couldn't one timestamp the email into the blockchain, without actually sending the email to the other party? Edit: btw, I released…
      nadaviv on HN
    • So you're acting as a trusted party to get delivery confirmations from Google? What if Google doesn't confirm delivery, but you decide to write to the blockchain anyway? Also,…
      nadaviv on HN

Alternatives named

  • Email signing with SPF, DKIM and DMARC

    From 2 comments
    • Yes, because the killer feature missing from SPF + DKIM + DMARC is "blockchain". <rolls eyes> Every time I see some new "<reliable tech>, now with Blockchain!" announcement, it…
      jlgaddis on HN
    • What benefit does the anchoring give over just the signing part? Surely the signature is enough to prove that the email is from the expected sender? I feel like this is just an…
      vivan on HN
  • Blockchain timestamping services such as btproof

    From 2 comments
    • How does that prove the email was sent, though? Couldn't one timestamp the email into the blockchain, without actually sending the email to the other party? Edit: btw, I released…
      nadaviv on HN
    • You can use a blockchian to as a trusted timestamping service https://strongcoin.com/blog/using_the_blockchain_as_a_trusted_timestamping_service Wether this would hold up in…
      1ba9115454 on HN
  • Streak CRM

    From 1 comment
    • What benefit does the anchoring give over just the signing part? Surely the signature is enough to prove that the email is from the expected sender? I feel like this is just an…
      vivan on HN

Category, keywords, summaries and labels on this page were made by AI (Thread Reader v2) and not checked by hand. Each point links to the comments it came from.

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