HiddenVM

Security and privacy

anti-forensics virtual machine

SHOW HN2020

429points
141comments
#71of 3,028 in 2020
Top 3%of 2020 by points

How HN took it

MixedNo clear lean

2 positive, 22 neutral or asking, 1 mixed, 21 critical, out of 46 comments about the project. Thread score -0.37.

Privacy: 0 for, 10 againstIdea: 1 for, 5 againstExecution: 0 for, 3 againstDesign: 0 for, 2 againstDocs: 0 for, 1 against

The thread, comment by comment

Each row is a top-level comment and its replies, in HN's order. Select a cell to open that comment on HN.

positive neutral or mixed critical about another commenter or something else the maker

What HN said

What people liked

  • Interesting project with clear privacy motivation

    From 1 comment
    • > The VM will even connect to full-speed pre-Tor Internet by default, while leaving the Tor connection in Tails undisturbed. This doesn't strike me as a selling point? Surely the…
      jstanley on HN

Objections

  • Deniability is weak against torture or coercion

    From 3 comments
    • Are there any protection mechanism against that? Something like, even if you are being tortured you cannot provide the access to anyone else?
      87zuhjkas on HN
    • In most instances I think torture would yield all of your knowledge including the secondary unlock. Unless you're thinking your attacker would exclude you from torture for…
      brianjlogan on HN
    • My understanding is that people who torture you don't know what you don't know; so they don't know when to stop. As such, they'll keep torturing you way past the point where…
      frandroid on HN
  • Default VM traffic bypassing Tor undermines privacy

    From 2 comments
    • > The VM will even connect to full-speed pre-Tor Internet by default, while leaving the Tor connection in Tails undisturbed. This doesn't strike me as a selling point? Surely the…
      jstanley on HN
    • > The VM will even connect to full-speed pre-Tor Internet by default Snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.
      ThePowerOfFuet on HN
  • Downloading extra software undermines code inspection

    From 1 comment
    • Isn't downloading additional software defeats the purpose of inspecting the code?
      a_imho on HN
  • Random free space on drive may look suspicious at borders

    From 2 comments
    • That's why TrueCrypt, and I think Vera Crypt have support for a volume that can be decripted with two keys - one will yield a decoy volume where its free space is actually the…
      joantune on HN
    • > if sufficiently motivated, there's no reason that an authoritarian state wouldn't just keep torturing you anyway. Sure, but it helps to make it look like you're someone not…
      bb88 on HN

Requests

  • Support macOS as a guest OS

    From 1 comment
    • Will be interesting to also have macOS as guest with Vera Crypt & encrypted volume etc.
      paulcarroty on HN
  • Rename project to avoid HVM acronym clash

    From 1 comment
    • Please consider an acronym other than "HVM", which already has meaning in virtualization context (Hardware Virtualized Machine).
      kchr on HN
  • Use stronger hash than md5sum for integrity checks

    From 1 comment
    • It is kind of ridiculous to still use md5sum to check software for integrity.
      hleszek on HN
  • Run from RAM disk

    From 1 comment
    • How about running from RAMdisk? Feels like that would be the safest
      haunter on HN

Questions

  • Whether the VeraCrypt volume is tied to a specific Tails stick

    From 2 comments
    • Hi, very cool project! I'm getting more into security so apologies if this is a stupid question. Is the veracrypt drive, and therefore the HVM, linked to my specific instance of…
      smashah on HN
    • > Is the veracrypt drive, and therefore the HVM, linked to my specific instance of tails or can it be accessed by anyone with a tails usb and my veracrypt authentication details?…
      aforensics on HN
  • Whether a Tails USB alone plus VeraCrypt is enough at a border

    From 2 comments
    • > Is the veracrypt drive, and therefore the HVM, linked to my specific instance of tails or can it be accessed by anyone with a tails usb and my veracrypt authentication details?…
      aforensics on HN
    • Red flags might not actually matter in many use cases. But where it does, setting up a decoy OS that boots on the computer by default when turned on may be one good strategy. For…
      aforensics on HN
  • Whether VM traffic should go over Tor by default

    From 1 comment
    • > The VM will even connect to full-speed pre-Tor Internet by default, while leaving the Tor connection in Tails undisturbed. This doesn't strike me as a selling point? Surely the…
      jstanley on HN

Alternatives named

  • Tails alone

    From 1 comment
    • If you want to use Tor in another country then come through a border, what's the advantage of HiddenVM over putting Tor on a bootable thumb drive, using it, then throwing away…
      ralphc on HN
  • Whonix

    From 1 comment
    • Well, the idea is that you don't have to be limited by Tor's speed or handicaps like being IP blocked when web browsing, if you don't want that by default. We love Tails' amnesia…
      aforensics on HN
  • VeraCrypt hidden volumes

    From 2 comments
    • I believe Truecrypt supported a feature where different passwords would unlock different partitions in a volume. So someone could ask you to input the password for BadBoy.tc, and…
      jmt_ on HN
    • That's why TrueCrypt, and I think Vera Crypt have support for a volume that can be decripted with two keys - one will yield a decoy volume where its free space is actually the…
      joantune on HN

Category, keywords, summaries and labels on this page were made by AI (Thread Reader v2) and not checked by hand. Each point links to the comments it came from.

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