59a34eabe31910abfb06f308

Security and privacy

perceptual hash collision demo

SHOW HN2021

339points
235comments
#100of 2,533 in 2021
Top 4%of 2021 by points

How HN took it

RoastedHalf or more of the comments are critical

5 positive, 23 neutral or asking, 2 mixed, 32 critical, out of 62 comments about the project. Thread score -0.34.

Privacy: 4 for, 29 againstIdea: 1 for, 1 againstExecution: 0 for, 2 against

The thread, comment by comment

Each row is a top-level comment and its replies, in HN's order. Select a cell to open that comment on HN.

positive neutral or mixed critical about another commenter or something else the maker

What HN said

What people liked

  • Demo is a clearer explanation of the danger than long articles

    From 1 comment
    • This simple site is a far better demo and explanation of the extreme danger of Apple's proposal than any of the long articles written about it. Thank you for caring enough to put…
      smt88 on HN
  • Useful for informing people about the proposal

    From 1 comment
    • Thank you for your kind words. This situation is something close to my heart, I think privacy should be a fundamental right for everyone, and it is essential to inform people.
      mono-bob on HN

Objections

  • Human review of low-res derivatives could let false positives through

    From 3 comments
    • The fact that they send a visual derivative of the image, such as a low-resolution version, makes the human review process tricky. Because there is, understandably, no actual…
      mono-bob on HN
    • Apple recieves a visual derivative of the image, such as a low-resolution version, for manual review. This makes the human review process tricky. Because there is,…
      mono-bob on HN
    • Not even that. Apple recieves a visual derivative of the image, such as a low-resolution version, for manual review. The downside it that this makes the human review process…
      mono-bob on HN
  • On-device scanning violates privacy and could be extended for censorship

    From 3 comments
    • It could flag you as a supporter of Free Hong Kong in China, women's rights in Afghanistan, or maybe just someone who likes gay porn in Russia. Building these types of systems is…
      echelon on HN
    • The point is that its done on our end, not apple's end. Many reasons this is bad. Obviously the "Slippery slope" argument around it scanning more in future and being abused by…
      vineyardmike on HN
    • Seems like this CSAM tech could be super useful in China for detecting winnie the pooh or other evidence of thought crime against the regime. Even if Apple doesn't end up rolling…
      umvi on HN
  • Perceptual hashes are susceptible to collisions

    From 2 comments
    • That's just incorrect. From the whitepaper: > Once Apple’s iCloud Photos servers decrypt a set of positive match vouchers for an account that exceeded the match threshold, the…
      prophesi on HN
    • Each image on the left has a blob vaguely similar to the highlights in the dog image on the right. Likely the "perceptual" algorithm isn't "perceiving" contrast the same way…
      WesolyKubeczek on HN

Requests

  • Make the attack work on the fly for user uploads

    From 1 comment
    • Cool! Now do one where the user uploads the image and it tweaks it to find a collision on the fly.
      drexlspivey on HN
  • Auditable hash database

    From 1 comment
    • Apple have stated that they will make the database of hashes that their system uses auditable by researchers. Does anyone know if that has happened yet? Is it possible to view…
      spuz on HN

Questions

  • How are collision images found or created

    From 1 comment
    • Can somebody please explain to me how one can go about finding images that have collision hashes? Or how you can create an image to have a specific hash?
      seanbarry on HN
  • Who controls the hash database

    From 1 comment
    • > For example, it's possible to detect political campaign posters or similar images on users' devices by extending the database. So who controls the database?
      DavideNL on HN

Alternatives named

  • Google and Microsoft cloud hash matching for CSAM

    From 1 comment
    • Now let's create one for the hash matching that Google, Microsoft, and other cloud providers use. If your problem with Apple's proposal is the fact they do hash matching (rather…
      slg on HN
  • Apple's own iCloud scanning

    From 1 comment
    • Bugs are kinda slippery slope arguments as well, since they are impossible to prevent or measure with 100% accuracy. These are stopped in human review. (Hopefully) It seems that…
      nicce on HN

Category, keywords, summaries and labels on this page were made by AI (Thread Reader v2) and not checked by hand. Each point links to the comments it came from.

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