Zerobox

Dev tools

sandboxing cli

SHOW HN2026

Zerobox

Sandbox any command with file, network, credential controls

github.com

#sandbox#process isolation#credential injection#network proxy

141points
93comments
#457of 4,366 in 2026
Top 11%of 2026 by points

How HN took it

CuriousMostly questions and neutral comments

7 positive, 23 neutral or asking, 3 mixed, 8 critical, out of 41 comments about the project. Thread score -0.01.

Idea: 5 for, 2 againstExecution: 0 for, 3 againstDocs: 0 for, 2 againstPrivacy: 1 for, 1 againstDesign: 1 for, 0 against

The thread, comment by comment

Each row is a top-level comment and its replies, in HN's order. Select a cell to open that comment on HN.

positive neutral or mixed critical about another commenter or something else the maker

What HN said

What people liked

  • Credential injection at the network proxy keeps secrets out of the sandboxed process

    From 2 comments
    • the credential injection via MITM proxy is the most interesting part to me. the standard approach for agents is environment variables, which means the agent process can read them…
      volume_tech on HN
    • This looks really good - the CLI interface design is solid, and I especially like the secrets / network proxy pattern - but the thing it needs most is copiously detailed…
      simonw on HN
  • Deny-by-default network and file policy

    From 1 comment
    • the credential injection via MITM proxy is the most interesting part to me. the standard approach for agents is environment variables, which means the agent process can read them…
      volume_tech on HN
  • Low overhead, about 10ms cold start

    From 2 comments
    • I added a benchmark test (Apple M5) and on average I'm seeing 10ms overhead. I added a benchmark section to the repo as well…
      afshinmeh on HN
    • Zerobox uses the same kernel mechanisms (namespaces + seccomp) but no daemon, no root and cold start ~10ms (Docker is much worse in that regard). Docker gives you full filesystem…
      afshinmeh on HN

Objections

  • Needs more documentation and testing evidence

    From 3 comments
    • This looks really good - the CLI interface design is solid, and I especially like the secrets / network proxy pattern - but the thing it needs most is copiously detailed…
      simonw on HN
    • You should probably add a huge disclaimer that this is an untested, experimental project. Related, a direct comparison to other sandboxes and what you offer over those would be…
      wepple on HN
    • Wish it wasn’t rust… it’s so hard to read.
      Lethalman on HN
  • Proxy-based domain filtering is best effort on macOS

    From 1 comment
    • On macOS, the proxy is best effort. Programs that ignore HTTPS_PROXY/HTTP_PROXY can connect directly. This is a platform limitation (macOS Seatbelt doesn't support forced proxy…
      afshinmeh on HN
  • Reliance on wrapping bubblewrap as a subprocess is questioned

    From 1 comment
    • This is more a criticism of codex's linux-sandboxing, which you're just wrapping, but it's the first I've ever looked at it. I don't see how it makes sense to invoke bwrap as a…
      nonameiguess on HN
  • Secrets passed on the command line are visible to other local processes

    From 1 comment
    • > zerobox --secret OPENAI_API_KEY=$OPENAI_API_KEY Linux by default allows all users to read CLI arguments of running processes. While it looks like your bwrap invocation prevents…
      lights0123 on HN

Requests

  • More detailed documentation of the sandbox mechanism and tests

    From 2 comments
    • This looks really good - the CLI interface design is solid, and I especially like the secrets / network proxy pattern - but the thing it needs most is copiously detailed…
      simonw on HN
    • Wish it wasn’t rust… it’s so hard to read.
      Lethalman on HN
  • Debug and audit logging of blocked operations

    From 2 comments
    • Cool project, and I think there would be a lot of value in just logging all operations.
      alyxya on HN
    • Does Zerobox support audit logging for blocked network or file operations?
      mina_jamshidian on HN
  • Docker usage guidance

    From 1 comment
    • Hey - I'd love for you to add a documented / standard way to use this inside dockers so we can use build on it for various agentic efforts. I've solved getting bubblewrap to work…
      rao-v on HN
  • Interactive profile building for reads

    From 1 comment
    • That's a really tough question. I always worry about credentials that are tucked away in ~/.folders in my home directory like in ~/.aws - but you HAVE to provide access to some…
      simonw on HN

Questions

  • How it compares to Docker and bubblewrap

    From 2 comments
    • This is really useful! How well does it compare though to Docker etc. Because I am worried about sandbox escapes. This is what we currently use to sandbox JS inside Browsers and…
      EGreg on HN
    • Personally I would probably always reach for a docker container if I want a sandboxed command that can run identically anywhere. I appreciate that alternate sandboxing tools can…
      eluded7 on HN
  • How the proxy intercepts traffic and handles certificates on macOS

    From 2 comments
    • How do you intercept network traffic on mac os? How do you fake certificates?
      mdavid626 on HN
    • Yeah, but how does the sandboxed process “know” that it has to go through the proxy? How does it trust your certificate? Is the proxy fully transparent?
      mdavid626 on HN
  • Whether it works inside containers

    From 1 comment

Alternatives named

  • Docker

    From 2 comments
    • Personally I would probably always reach for a docker container if I want a sandboxed command that can run identically anywhere. I appreciate that alternate sandboxing tools can…
      eluded7 on HN
    • This is really useful! How well does it compare though to Docker etc. Because I am worried about sandbox escapes. This is what we currently use to sandbox JS inside Browsers and…
      EGreg on HN
  • bubblewrap

    From 1 comment
    • Personally I would probably always reach for a docker container if I want a sandboxed command that can run identically anywhere. I appreciate that alternate sandboxing tools can…
      eluded7 on HN
  • sandbox-exec

    From 1 comment
    • I trust sandbox-exec more, or Docker on Linux. Those come from the OS, well tested and known. MITM proxy is nice idea to avoid leaking secrets. Isn’t it very brittle though?…
      mdavid626 on HN
  • Deno sandboxing

    From 1 comment
    • Thanks and agreed! Zerobox uses the Deno sandboxing policy and also the same pattern for cred injection (placeholders as env vars, replaced at network call time). Real secrets…
      afshinmeh on HN

Category, keywords, summaries and labels on this page were made by AI (Thread Reader v2) and not checked by hand. Each point links to the comments it came from.

Add a badge to your READMEShown on HackerShow
[![Shown on HackerShow](https://hackershow.org/badge.svg)](https://hackershow.org/show/47574871)